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CONTEMPT OF COURT: WISCONSIN'S
ERASURE OF THE BLURRED DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
I. INTRODUCTION
"From time immemorial, certain powers have been con-
ceded to courts because they are courts. Such powers have
been conceded because without them [courts] could neither
maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor accom-
plish the purpose of their existence. These powers are called
inherent powers."' The contempt power is considered an in-
herent power2 enabling courts to protect their authority, 3
maintain order in their courtrooms, 4 compel compliance
with their decrees5 and protect the rights of parties to ac-
tions.6 Without this power, courts would be "mere boards of
arbitration ' 7 or "debating socie[ties]," 8  issuing advisory
opinions.
Although the contempt power is inherent and "consists
largely of judge-made law,"9 the power is not absolute.' 0
Wisconsin courts have generally allowed legislative regula-
1. State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603, 603 (1928).
2. Eg., State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 306, 323, 187 N.W. 830, 835,
841 (1922); Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J.
1513, 1514 (1972).
3. E.g., In re Kading, 74 Wis. 2d 405, 411, 246 N.W.2d 903, 906 (1976).
4. E.g., Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1514-16; Dobbs, Contempt of Court A Sur-
vey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 184 (1971). See also N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN,
DISORDER IN THE COURT 17 (1973) ("[C]ourtroom disruption threatens the system of
orderly justice.").
5. See, e.g., In re Kading, 74 Wis. 2d 405, 411, 246 N.W.2d 903, 906 (1976); State
ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 323, 187 N.W. 830, 841 (1922); Brautigam,
supra note 2, at 1515; Dobbs, supra note 4, at 184.
6. E.g., Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Mews, 29 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 138
N.W.2d 147, 153 (1965).
7. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911); State ex rel
Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 324, 187 N.W. 830, 842 (1922).
8. State ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193, 194
(1897). See also Comment, Contempt fCourt: Some Considerationsfor Reform, 1975
Wis. L. REv. 1117, 1117.
9. Comment, supra note 8, at 1117 (citing Dobbs, supra note 4, at 185).
10. Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d
324, 330 (1963).
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tion of the power," within reasonable limits such that the
courts will be left with sufficient authority to accomplish
their intended purposes. The earliest Wisconsin statutes
included contempt provisions,13 but courts nevertheless ex-
hibited confusion about the extent of the power, the kind of
contempt involved in a particular case and the penalty al-
lowed in any given case.' 4 A major factor creating the confu-
sion was the attempt to distinguish between civil contempt
and criminal contempt. 5
The Wisconsin Legislature attempted to clarify the con-
tempt confusion in 1975,16 but left intact the civil-criminal
distinction. The confusion and criticism, therefore, contin-
ued. 7 In 1979 the Wisconsin Legislature again repealed the
statutory contempt provisions and created new provisions
which eliminated attempts to distinguish between civil and
criminal contempt.18
This comment briefly discusses, for the sake of clarity,
the kinds of conduct constituting contempt and how such be-
havior traditionally has been classified. It then explains the
bases for and the importance of the civil-criminal distinction
and illustrates how the boundaries have been blurred. Next
follows a review of Wisconsin's efforts to codify and clarify
the contempt power, culminating in the 1979 legislative ef-
11. Id (citing Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Washburn Brewing Assn, 122 Wis. 515,
518, 100 N.W. 832, 833 (1904)). See generally infra Part III,.4.
12. State ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193, 194
(1897):
Doubtless, this power may be regulated, and the manner of its exercise pre-
scribed, by statute, but certainly it cannot be entirely taken away, nor can its
efficiency be so impaired or abridged as to leave the court without power to
compel the due respect and obedience which is essential to preserve its charac-
ter as a judicial tribunal.
13. Wis. STAT. ch. 87, §§ 7-9 (1849); id ch. 115, §§ 1-2, 20-25 (1849) (repealed
and recreated by 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 401, §§ 2-3).
14. See infra Part IV, B.
15. See infra Part III,A & C.
16. 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 401, §§ 2-3. For details of the changes wrought, see the
analysis of the proposed bill in Comment, supra note 8, at 1130-34. See also Marti-
neau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Conftsion Between Civil and Criminal Con-
tempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 686 (1981) ("The underlying purpose of this statute was
to preserve the distinction between civil and criminal contempt by sharpening the
differences between them.").
17. See infra Part IV.
18. 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 257, § 11.
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fort. Finally, this comment raises questions about the effec-
tiveness of the change and discusses further modifications
that may be necessary.
II. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING
CONTEMPTUOUS CONDUCT
A. Definitions of Contempt
"Contempt of court consists of an act or omission sub-
stantially disrupting or obstructing the judicial process in a
particular case." 19 Despite the apparent simplicity of this
sentence, judges, legislators and commentators have been
unable to precisely define the concept and what conduct it
embraces.20 Ultimately, contempt is often determined by the
previously established relationship between the judge and
the actor, the mood of the judge or the manner in which the
act is committed.2' The contempt can involve parties to ac-
tions, attorneys, witnesses or spectators.22 Contempt can oc-
cur inside or outside courtrooms, within or outside the actual
presence of the judge acting in an official capacity.23
19. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 185.
20. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1526; Comment, supra note 8, at 1117. For Wis-
consin's statutory definitions, see infra Part IV, .4.
21. State exrel Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 575, 105 N.W.2d 876,
884 (1960); Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1525.
22. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4passirn.
23. The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished the presence of the judge as an
individual from the judge as the court:
[S]ociety . . .has accorded to courts the greatest respect. . . .This respect is
not accorded to the Judge - the man. The Judge presiding over a court is one
character. The Judge in his chambers another. The Judge in his home or on
the street quite another. The Judge as an individual may or may not be ac-
corded the respect which by common consent belongs to the institution - the
Court. The Judge as the individual is not entitled per se to any particular
degree of respect. . . .It is the institution - the Court - to which belongs
that degree of respect commensurate with the place which it occupies in the
scheme of organized society. The Judge and the Court are not identical. The
Judge is a man. The Court is an institution. It requires something more than a
Judge sitting on the bench to constitute a Court. It requires, in addition, the
existence of conditions authorizing the exercise of the powers of a court. It
requires the presence of that upon or over which the powers of a court may be
exerted, namely, a controversy involving legal or human rights. It requires the
presence of litigants, generally attorneys, usually officers, such as bailiff, clerk,
etc., and frequently jurors. To constitute a court, some of these elements must
concur with the presence of a presiding judge. It is this institution, as distin-
guished from the Judge, that merits and enjoys the respect of society.
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Conduct constituting contempt can be roughly catego-
rized24 as (1) disruptive, (2) obstructive and (3) disobedient
or defiant conduct.2 - These categories will be addressed sep-
arately although they frequently overlap.
Disruptive conduct usually refers to conduct occurring in
the courtroom while court is in session which tends to pre-
vent the orderly progression of cdurt proceedings.26 This be-
nign definition fails to fully illustrate the kind of conduct
involved-conduct which often completely halts a trial or
other court proceeding until order is restored. Examples of
this kind of contemptuous conduct include repeatedly inter-
rupting;27 insulting other persons in court;28 physically as-
saulting persons in the courtroom; 29 noisemaking, including
shouting, clapping, pounding, and stamping feet;30 being
tardy or absent without excuse,31 making frivolous or insub-
stantial objections and arguments, 32 disregarding court rul-
Rubin v. State, 192 Wis. 1, 6-7, 211 N.W. 926, 928-29 (1927), cited in State v. Dickson,
53 Wis. 2d 532, 542, 193 N.W.2d 17, 23 (1972).
The distinction is important, but judges often ignore it and treat any personal
affront as a contempt of court. See, e.g., State v. Dickson, 53 Wis. 2d 532, 193 N.W.2d
17 (1972) (attorney disregarded clerk's order to have client present at pretrial confer-
ence); State ex rel Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960)
(county purchasing agent refused to authorize county payment for air conditioner in
judge's chambers); O'Brien v. State, 261 Wis. 570, 53 N.W.2d 534 (1952) (attorney
questioned whether judge had brains). Cf. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4,
at 90-95, 149-52 (suggestion that courts overlook parties' passive disrespect and single
insulting or obscene outbursts, and be somewhat tolerant of attorneys' disrespect un-
less it becomes disruptive or obstructive).
24. "No classification of factual patterns can be an absolute one; each situation
shades into others .... Dobbs, supra note 4, at 186.
25. A fourth category, affronts to the dignity of the court, comprises conduct
which can be classified with any of the other three categories, depending upon the
nature of the conduct, and may involve conduct which should not be considered con-
tempt at all. See supra note 23. Typical of this category are inappropriate attire,
passive disrespect, such as refusing to rise, and refusing to use respectful terms of
address. See Dobbs, supra note 4, at 200-04.
26. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 785.01 (1979).
27. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 72-74.
28. United States v. Seals, 461 F.2d 345, 382 (7th Cir. 1972), quotedin N. DOR-
sEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 58-59. See also Dobbs, supra note 4, at 205-06
("insulting tone of voice" insufficient if words themselves not insulting, but assertions
that judge is biased are very likely to be sufficient).
29. Recent and ancient examples of such assaults are discussed in Dobbs, supra
note 4, at 187 & n.9.
30. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4passim.
31. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 187-88.
32. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
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ings33 and otherwise engaging in tactics designed to delay or
interfere with the proceedings. 4 It is not contumacious,
however, for an attorney to respectfully, but firmly, disagree
with a judge's viewpoint.3 5
Obstructive conduct may occur during court proceedings,
but more often occurs outside the court. Such conduct
"tends to subvert fairness or efficiency" 36 in the judicial pro-
cess, thereby reducing or eliminating the opportunity for a
fair trial. Examples include bribing, threatening or intimi-
dating court officers, jurors, witnesses, judges or opposing
parties,37 avoiding execution of process, 38 altering docu-
ments,39 refusing to testify4° and concealing property to
avoid levy.41
Disobedient or defiant conduct generally occurs outside
the courtroom, as when someone refuses to comply with an
interlocutory or final order in a case.42 Examples include vi-
olating labor injunctions,43 failing to make payments as or-
dered,44 refusing to testify before a grand jury,45 refusing to
33. Id
34. Id.
35. State v. Dickson, 53 Wis. 2d 532, 540, 193 N.W.2d 17, 22 (1972).
36. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 189.
37. Id at 189-91; O'Brien v. State, 261 Wis. 570, 53 N.W.2d 534 (1952).
38. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 185 n.3.
39. Id at 198-99.
40. Id at 195-96. But the Supreme Court has held that finding a witness in con-
tempt for perjury is improper. Eg, In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945); Exparte
Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919), discussed in Dobbs, supra note 4, at 196-97.
41. Id at 190.
42. "[I]ntentional defiance of the court's. . . judgment. . . cannot be condoned
. " Wisconsin's Employment Relations Bd. v. Mews, 29 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 138
N.W.2d 147, 153 (1965).
The order must be an order by the judge in his or her official capacity, not an
order signed by a clerk, State v. Dickson, 53 Wis. 2d 532, 540-41, 193 N.W.2d 17, 22
(1972) because "there can be no contempt, in the legal sense, of a clerk of court." Id
at 541, 193 N.W.2d at 22.
43. E.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); State v.
King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978).
44. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442 (1911); Schroeder v.
Schroeder, 95 Wis. 2d 415, 420, 290 N.W.2d 548, 550 (1980), rev'd on other grounds,
100 Wis. 2d 625, 302 N.W.2d 475 (1981). The failure to pay must be a deliberate
defiance of the court's order, a person cannot be held in contempt for failure to pay if
unable to pay. Mercury Records Prods. v. Economic Consultants, 91 Wis. 2d 482,
504-06, 283 N.W.2d 613, 624-25 (Ct. App. 1979).
45. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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file a financial statement 46 and refusing to produce a hand-
writing sample.47
B. Classifcations of Contempt
Classification of the contemptuous conduct has always
been considered important because, traditionally, the nature
of the sanction is governed by the kind of contempt in-
volved.48 Courts then determine the appropriate procedures
to impose the sanctions.49 An astonishing array of classifica-
tions has developed,50 but only two classifications, civil-
criminal and direct-indirect, are widely used today.5
Although classifications ostensibly classify the contemp-
tuous conduct, the contemptuous conduct is not the primary
concern. In a rather backward manner, the classification is
usually determined on the basis of the relief granted or sen-
tence imposed. 2
It is not the nature of the act itself, but rather the manner in
which it was committed, its resultant injury to parties to the
action or to the dignity and authority of the court, the na-
ture of the relief sought, and the manner in which the act
was brought to the attention of the court which have been
the factors determining the character of the contempt. 53
At the same time, the nature of the proceeding is deter-
mined by whether the contemptuous act occurred within or
outside the presence of the judge. Thus, a direct contempt,
that is, one occurring in the immediate presence of the court,
may be dealt with summarily,54 regardless of whether it is
46. In re Kading, 74 Wis. 2d 405, 246 N.W.2d 903 (1976),
47. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).
48. R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 48 (1963).
49. Martineau, supra note 16, at 681.
50. Id at 681-83 (civil-criminal, direct-indirect or constructive, positive-passive,
punitive-remedial, aid to litigant-protection of the authority and dignity of the court,
mandatory-prohibitory, state-private and willful-inadvertent).
51. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 47-48; Martineau, supra note 16, at 681.
52. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 236; Martineau, supra note 16, at 681.
53. Statute Law, Contempt-Distinctions in Adjudicated Wisconsin Cases Between
Civil and Criminal Contempts, 9 Wis. L. REv. 166, 170 (1934).
54. The summary procedure allows the court to deal with the contemptuous con-
duct immediately, without a hearing or consideration of possible mitigating factors.
The summary power is justified on the grounds that it provides a convenient means
for the court to maintain order and it avoids additional burdens on the court system.
See Comment, Counsel and Contempt: .4 Suggestion That the Summary Power Be
[Vol. 66:369
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later determined to be criminal or civil in nature.5 5 The ra-
tionale for this approach is that the judge, through personal
observation, has seen all the evidence regarding the incident
and can, therefore, render judgment.56 On the other hand,
an indirect contempt, that is, one occurring outside the direct
observation of the court, requires the usual factfinding pro-
cedures such as presentation of evidence and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses. 7
When contemptuous conduct occurs indirectly, the civil-
criminal distinction becomes crucial. In general, civil con-
tempt sanctions are remedial or coercive, while criminal
contempt sanctions are purely punitive." The importance of
the distinction, and the confusion surrounding it, is detailed
in the following section.
III. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
A. Bases of the Distinction
Establishing whether a particular case of contemptuous
conduct constitutes a civil or a criminal contempt is far from
being a "purely academic" question. 9 A variety of rights
and procedures are dependent upon which kind of contempt
is involved.60
The standard analysis of contempt focuses upon the
sanction involved: the kind of sanction imposed and the rea-
son for the sanction being imposed.6 ' This results in an Al-
Eliminated, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 289, 290, 293 (1980). See also Note, 11 GOLDEN GATE
L. REv. 153, 160 (1981) ("Summary contempt is a drastic remedy and should be used
only when there is a compelling reason for immediate action.").
55. There is no need for the civil-criminal distinction in a summary proceeding.
Statute Law, supra note 49, at 168.
56. Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d
324, 330 (1963). Courts have circumvented the "actual presence of the court" require-
ment by rationalizing that "the court is figuratively present in all parts of the place set
aside for its use." R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 73. This rationale allows the court
to proceed summarily against persons about whose conduct the court could have only
second-hand knowledge, such as bribing a juror. Id
57. Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d
324, 330 (1963).
58. Id at 13-14, 125 N.W.2d at 328.
59. Statute Law, supra note 53, at 166.
60. See supra Part III, B.
61. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Southern
Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968). Neither judicial mandate nor
19831
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ice in Wonderland approach to the problem,62 in that the
conduct is classified and dealt with according to the nature
of the penalty imposed, rather than on the basis of the offen-
sive conduct itself. Thus, the contemnor has already had his
or her day in court (if the nonsummary procedure is used)
and has had the appropriate sanction imposed before know-
ing whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.
One author criticizes this approach on the ground that
"[b]y characterizing the nature of contempt according to the
sanction imposed, the courts have closed the circle of their
logic. To state an act constitutes criminal contempt because
criminal sanctions are applied merely completes a tautology.
This approach provides no aid to analysis. 63 It is precisely
because of this circular reasoning that problems arise in dis-
tinguishing criminal and civil contempt. "The greatest per-
centage of cases of contempt could fall into either category,
depending ...upon the discretion of the particular deci-
sion-maker." 6
The primary purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to
coerce the contemnor into compliance with a prior court or-
der.65 The contemptuous conduct consists of refusing to do
as the court ordered, usually in terms of failing to perform
an affirmative act.66 The primary purpose of criminal con-
tempt proceedings is to punish the contemnor for a disobedi-
ent act.67 The contemptuous conduct consists of doing
something prohibited by the court, whether by violating a
legislation has ever required a judge to establish the potential sanction before begin-
ning the contempt proceeding. Martineau, supra note 16, at 684.
62. "'Sentence first-verdict afterwards,'" L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES
IN WONDERLAND 113 (1960) (Ist ed. 1865). See also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at
178 ("distinction between civil and criminal contempt has often been no more than a
matter of hindsighted classifications of characteristics").
63. Comment, supra note 8, at 1120.
64. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 53.
65. Eg., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers
Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1977); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 129-30, 262
N.W.2d 80, 82 (1978).
66. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911); Skinner v.
White, 505 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir.
1977); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 82 (1978).
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specific court order or by interfering with orderly judicial
process. 68
Civil contempt is said to be entirely for the benefit of an-
other party in the pending cause of action.69 "There is no
question but that a court may imprison one who, violating
its orders, thereby interferes with, impedes, defeats, or repu-
diates the rights or remedies of a litigant. 70 Sanctions for
civil contempt, including imprisonment and daily fines, are
intended to compel the recalcitrant party to perform as re-
quired,7 ' presumably for the benefit of an opposing party.72
In addition, a contemnor may be assessed damages to in-
demnify the opposing party for any losses suffered as a result
of the contemnor's failure to comply. 73 A criminal contempt
is not intended to benefit anyone; the sanction, be it fine or
imprisonment, is imposed for the sole purpose of vindicating
the authority of the court.74
A distinctive feature of civil contempt is that once the
sanction is imposed, it usually continues indefinitely until
the contemnor capitulates and performs as ordered. The
sanction continues only as long as the disobedience contin-
ues. Although the cumulative effect could easily exceed any
statutory limitations upon sanctions for criminal contempt,76
68. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911); see also
supra Part II, A.
69. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968); Schroeder v.
Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 639, 302 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1981).
70. State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 332, 187 N.W. 830, 845 (1922)
(Eschweiler, J., dissenting).
71. See Dobbs, supra note 4, at 235-36.
72. Punishing someone until the person cooperates, however, "is as much a pun-
ishment of his original refusal to do that same act as it is a coercion of his doing it in
the future." R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 60.
73. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968); Getka v. Lader,
71 Wis. 2d 237, 248, 238 N.W.2d 87, 93 (1976) (damages limited to actual indemnifi-
cation; damages distinct from fine).
74. United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1182 (3d Cir. 1976);
State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978).
75. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); State v. King, 82
Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (1978). See also Brautigam, supra note 2, at
1523 n.61; Dobbs, supra note 4, at 237.
76. Statutes often have limits on sanctions for criminal contempt. E.g, Wis.
STAT. § 785.04(2) (1979) (maximum of $5,000 fine or one year in jail or both). Wis-
consin also limits remedial sanctions. Wis. STAT. § 785.04(1) (1979) (inter alia, maxi-
mum of six months in jail or forfeiture of $2,000 per day or both). Thus, coercive
imprisonment cannot exceed punitive imprisonment, but at $2,000per day the forfei-
ture can quickly surpass the maximum punitive fine.
1983]
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the indefinite penalty is allowed because the contemnor can
be released from jail or have the fine stop accumulating by
complying with the court order.77 A contemnor can purge
himself or herself of the contumacious conduct.78
Criminal sanctions, however, are definite and offer no
opportunity for purging.79 The emphasis is upon punishing
past acts of the contemnor, not upon coercing future compli-
ance.8 0 "[I]f the defendant does that which he has been com-
manded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished.
Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done,
nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused
by the disobedience. ' 1 One author interprets the preceding
statement as meaning that "the sanction is necessarily a
criminal one if nothing is left to coerce. ' 2
A final distinction is that civil contempt actions are part
of the same cause of action out of which they arise. 3 The
offended party to the pending cause of action must petition
the court for relief from the opposing party's refusal to com-
ply with the court's order. Criminal contempt is an offense
77. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); In re Nevitt, 117 F.
448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (The contemnor "carries the keys of his prison in his own
pocket."); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (1978). If resist-
ance is based upon moral principles, however, the likelihood of capitulation is low, to
the point that continuing the coercive sanction indefinitely becomes cruel and oner-
ous. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1958).
78. The court order finding the person in contempt and imposing the sanction
must also inform the contemnor how the contemptuous conduct can be purged.
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 639, 302 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1981).
The contemnor must also have the ability to comply and cannot be imprisoned
when purging is impossible. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,371 (1966) (con-
temnor who refused to testify before grand jury had to be released from jail when the
grand jury was discharged; could no longer purge self by testifying); United States v.
Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978) (tax attorney with no trial experience who
appeared on behalf of law partner merely to request adjournment was improperly
held in contempt for refusing to immediately proceed to trial of felony criminal case);
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 638, 302 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1981) (person
failing to make payments pursuant to final divorce judgment can be imprisoned only
after court determines that person is able to make payments but refuses to do so).
79. Eg., Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1968); State v.
King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978).
80. E.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th
Cir. 1977); Comment, supra note 8, at 1120.
81. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
82. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 240.
83. Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1974).
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against the government, a flouting of the court's authority. 4
Consequently, the opposing party has no interest in the pro-
ceedings for criminal contempt. The criminal contempt is
either treated summarily or is handled similarly to other of-
fenses against the government, using the usual criminal jus-
tice procedures."5
In summary, civil contempt is between parties to an un-
derlying cause of action and is designed to coerce compli-
ance with a court order for the benefit of the other party.
Sanctions can be remedial or coercive and include damages
to indemnify the other party for losses sustained as a result
of the contumacious conduct, fines or imprisonment, which
can be indefinite, continuing until the contemnor complies.
Civil contempt is prospective in nature,86 intended to en-
courage the contemnor to purge the contumacious conduct
by future compliance.
Conversely, criminal contempt is an offense against the
authority of the court, involving only the government and
the contemnor, and is designed to punish a contemnor for a
prior action or omission. Sanctions, which in this context
are always punitive, include fines and imprisonment, but the
punishment must be definite and within statutorily defined
limits. Criminal contempt is retrospective in nature,8 7 in-
tended only to punish, without providing for future good
conduct.
Evaluating these distinctions often requires close scrutiny
of the terminology used in a contempt order.8 Perhaps the
best approach was suggested by the United States Supreme
Court: "[WIhat does the court primarily seek to accomplish
84. Id Accord State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 317, 187 N.W. 830,
839 (1922).
85. E.g., Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17-18, 125
N.W.2d 324, 330 (1963).
86. United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. Id
88. Thurman, Contemptfor Nonsupport in Horida-Civil or CriminalProceeding?,
9 STEna'soN L. REv. 333, 338 (1980).
"These formulas for distinction offer no clear guide for the actor, who cannot
know whether his conduct goes so far as to interfere with the law in general, or
whether it is merely an interference with a private party who is an adjunct to the
administration of law." R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 53.
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• . . ?"9 If the court wants to compel obedience to a previ-
ous order for the benefit of a party, a civil contempt is proba-
bly involved. If the court wants to punish someone for
interfering with court proceedings, a criminal contempt is
probably involved. When neither civil nor criminal con-
tempt is readily discernible, a presumption in favor of civil
contempt arises.90
B. Importance of the Distinction
Courts and commentators agree that the most important
reason for attempting to distinguish between civil and crimi-
nal contempt is that, generally, more constitutional due pro-
cess safeguards attach to criminal contempt proceedings
than to civil contempt proceedings. 91 In nonsummary pro-
ceedings for criminal contempt, the contemnor is entitled to
notice that the proceeding concerns criminal charges and is
not a civil suit.92 A person then is presumed innocent unless
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is entitled to an
unbiased judge, has the right to call and cross-examine wit-
nesses, must be allowed a reasonable amount of time to pre-
pare a defense, cannot be compelled to testify against
himself or herself and has the right to trial by jury if the
potential sentence is for more than six months.93 "Although
the procedure required in criminal contempt is ...cumber-
some, costly and time-consuming, it is not the policy of the
law to choose expediency over due process when it should be
afforded. ' 94 Imposing criminal contempt sanctions after the
proceeding has been conducted as that of a civil contempt
89. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 370.
90. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 704 (1969), cited in
United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978).
91. E.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); State
v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 131, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978); Dobbs, supra note 4, at 235,
242; Martineau, supra note 16, at 697 & n.126; Thurman, supra note 88, at 335; Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 1120-21. But see infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
92. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 446 (1911); Pabst Brew-
ing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 1977). Accord
Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 966 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979) (constructive notice not
sufficient).
93. E.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Pabst
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 1977); State v.
King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 131, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978).
94. State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 138, 262 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1978).
[Vol. 66:369
CONTEMPT OF COURT
constitutes a denial of due process and will be reversed on
appeal.9"
The extensive due process protections available to crimi-
nal defendants are generally considered unnecessary for civil
contempt proceedings because any sanction imposed is, in a
sense, self-imposed by the contemnor, who can avoid any
sanction by complying with the court's order.96 Some proce-
dural safeguards are provided, such as notice and a hearing,
but the civil standard of proof applies, and most traditional
due process protections are absent.97 The potential for dep-
rivation of liberty, however, has prompted challenges to and
modification of this distinction.98 For example, the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals recently held that when "the State is
exercising its police powers to threaten an individual's lib-
erty," the individual is entitled to counsel, regardless of
whether the imprisonment will be coercive rather than
punitive.99
The second reason for determining whether a contempt
is civil or criminal concerns appellate rights. Because a civil
contempt proceeding is considered part of the original cause
of action,' °° involving the same parties, a contempt citation
is treated as an interlocutory order and, consequently, can-
not be appealed through the usual appellate channels until
the entire cause of action ends.10' If the contemnor is incar-
cerated as a result of the contempt finding, a writ of habeas
corpus may be used to challenge the finding. 0 2 If a fine is
imposed, Wisconsin allows interlocutory appeals in certain
circumstances.0 3 In either case, the reviewing court may stay
the imposition of the sanction until it can hear the matter.' 4
95. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1968).
96. Eg., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,370-71 (1966); State v. King, 82
Wis. 2d 124, 131, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978).
97. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 243; Comment, supra note 8, at 1123-24. The latter
author argues that a contemnor should be afforded criminal due process protections
unless his or her position in the civil contempt proceeding is "equivalent to that of a
litigant in an ordinary civil suit." Comment, supra note 8, at 1123.
98. See Thurman, supra note 88, at 335.
99. Brotzman v. Brotzman, 91 Wis.2d 335, 339, 283 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Ct. App.
1979).
100. Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1974).
101. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery
Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1977); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403
F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
102. Wis. STAT. § 782.01 (1979).
103. Id § 808.03(2) (1979).
104. Id § 808.07(2) (1979).
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A criminal contempt citation, however, can be appealed
through the usual appellate channels immediately because
the contempt proceeding constitutes a separate cause of ac-
tion. 0 5 The adjudication of contempt is a final order in that
proceeding and, therefore, is appealable regardless of the
stage of any underlying cause of action.1°6
C Blurring of the Boundaries
Despite the detailed guidelines available for determining
whether a particular act should be treated as civil or criminal
contempt,10 7  considerable confusion exists because the
boundaries are not as definite as they initially appear to
be.10 8 Frequently, civil and criminal contempt "are consid-
ered but nuances of each other and are often applied inter-
changeably."' 1 9  One author who limited his focus to
Wisconsin cases found it was "impossible to determine
whether any specific contumacious act is a civil or a criminal
contempt."' 10
In many cases, civil and criminal contempt are virtually
inseparable."' One act may constitute both civil and crimi-
nal contempt." 2 For example, if a court imposes a gag order
105. Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brew-
ery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1977); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403
F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
107. See supra Part III, A.
108. Part of the problem may be the tendency to refer to "punishment" for civil
contempt as well as criminal contempt, and references to a contemnor being found
"guilty of' civil contempt. See, e.g., Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers' Int'l Union,
22 Wis. 2d 7, 11, 125 N.W.2d 324, 327 (1963); State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis.
295, 316, 187 N.W. 830, 835 (1922).
109. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 51.
110. Statute Law, supra note 53, at 169. Examples of acts found to be civil con-
tempt in one case and criminal contempt in another included violations of labor in-
junctions, sheriffs failure to levy on property or execute writ, violations of other
injunctions and prevarication/perjury. 1d at 169-70 n.29. See also R. GOLDFARB,
supra note 48, at 52-53.
111. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1521 n.55.
112. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (violation
of labor injunction); Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 13-
14, 125 N.W.2d 324, 328 (1963) (violation of labor injunction); Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd. v. Allis-Chalmers Workers' Union, 249 Wis. 590, 598, 25 N.W.2d
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to prevent jurors from being influenced by media reports of
a trial, the order is apparently intended to benefit the parties
by ensuring a fair trial. If one party violates the gag order,
that party could be found in civil contempt for prejudicing
the rights of the other party, or in criminal contempt for
flouting the authority of the court, or both. Enforcing com-
pliance through civil contempt proceedings would protect
the rights of the other party and vindicate the court's author-
ity at the same time. 11 3  Vindicating the court's authority
through criminal sanctions would also result in a benefit to
the other party in that the sanction would encourage future
compliance. It is perhaps "immaterial to consider the dis-
tinction" since "both kinds involve the vindication of the au-
thority of the court."'"1 4
The traditional method of determining the kind of con-
tempt involved by looking to the sanction imposed"15 is inef-
fective in many cases. A fine or imprisonment can be
imposed either to coerce or to punish, thus providing no
clear basis for distinction. The nature of the act or omission
also provides no assistance because, in one sense, both civil
and criminal contempt deal with acts of disobedience." 6
The purpose of the contempt sanction provides a slightly
more reliable test for whether civil or criminal contempt is
involved: the purpose of criminal sanctions is to punish for
past misconduct; the purpose of civil sanctions is to coerce
future compliance or to remedy a failure to comply." 7 But
confusion persists. In one Wisconsin case, a person was
found "guilty" of civil contempt for violating a labor injunc-
425, 429 (1946) (refusal to comply with final judgment by court); Wetzler v. Glassner,
185 Wis. 593, 595-96, 201 N.W. 740, 740-41 (1925) (attorneys discussing trial in pres-
ence of juror, inviting juror to lunch).
113. "The civil nature of the contempt is not turned criminal by the court's efforts
at vindicating its authority, an interest which may be implicated in either civil or
criminal proceedings." United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir.
1978).
114. Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 F. 105, 106
(6th Cir. 1904), cited in Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1523.
115. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911).
116. Comment, supra note 8, at 1120.
117. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); United States v.
Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978) ("giving principal weight to the puni-
tive-remedial dichotomy").
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tion, then sentenced to six months in jail without opportu-
nity to purge."18
How the parties or the trial court label a contempt pro-
ceeding is usually ignored by appellate courts.1 9 For exam-
ple, in Shillitani v. United States120 the United States
Supreme Court reviewed contempt proceedings which re-
sulted in the contemnors being jailed until they agreed to
testify before a grand jury. The Court concluded that the
proceedings were civil because the sanctions were essentially
remedial: "The fact that both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals called petitioners' conduct 'criminal con-
tempt' does not disturb our conclusion. Courts often speak
in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial
purposes."' 2'
In many cases, "[the] melange of civil and criminal traits
prevents, even on appeal, a determination of the true charac-
ter of the proceedings .. ,122 The frustration experienced
by courts attempting to deal with contempt cases was per-
haps best expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
The simple fact is that no one, simply no one, is able to
determine whether this was begun, tried, or ended as a case
for criminal contempt, civil contempt, or both, or whether
someplace down the trail, begun as one it was transmuted
into the other. That is, of course, one thing about which
there may not be any doubt if a contempt order is to
stand. 23
118. Upper Lakes Shipping v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 11, 125
N.W.2d 324, 327 (1963).
119. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 424-27, 445-52 (1911)
(contempt proceedings treated as part of original civil case between same parties, but
definite jail sentences imposed; appeals court treated as criminal contempt; Supreme
Court reversed and remanded to district court to allow proper procedures to be fol-
lowed); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir.
1977) (parties, pleadings and court referred to proceedings as civil; circuit court found
criminal contempt); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 131-32, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83-84
(1978) (parties and trial courts agreed proceedings were for civil contempt; supreme
court held proceedings were for criminal contempt because "coercive or remedial ac-
tion could serve no purpose at that time. The only purpose. . . was punishment to
vindicate the authority of the court.").
120. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
121. Id at 369.
122. Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1974).
123. Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1966), cited in Skinner v.
White, 505 F.2d 685, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1974).
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IV. WISCONSIN: THE PRIOR LAW AND THE PROBLEMS
A. Statutes
Although courts traditionally have considered the con-
tempt power an inherent power, 124 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court long has recognized legislative authority to regulate
the power. 125 But the court has consistently held that legisla-
tive regulation must be "reasonable." 126  The contempt
power "cannot be entirely taken away, nor can its efficiency
be so impaired or abridged as to leave the court without
power to compel the due respect and obedience which is es-
sential to preserve its character as a judicial tribunal."'127
The court clearly intends to maintain control over the con-
tempt power, but will allow the legislature to attempt to de-
fine contemptuous conduct and to outline appropriate
procedures and penalties. 28 Legislative enactments in this
area have not yet conflicted with the court's interpretation of
the power.1
29
Until the 1979 statutes completely revised Wisconsin's
codified contempt law, 130  Wisconsin legislatures always
124. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Washburn Brewing Ass'n, 122 Wis. 515,
518, 100 N.W. 832, 833 (1904). But cf Getka v. Lader, 71 Wis. 2d 237, 247, 238
N.W.2d 87, 92 (1976); State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 314, 187 N.W. 830,
838 (1922). Language in both decisions seems to imply that the power is derived from
the legislature. One of the dissents in the latter decision also comments that the inher-
ent contempt power is "not superior to the rights of the people, for all power, in the
last analysis, is grantedby and comes from the people." State ex rel Rodd v. Verage,
177 Wis. 295, 351, 187 N.W. 830, 851 (1922) (Doerfler, J., dissenting) (emphasis ad-
ded). The legislature, of course, is the vehicle for implementing the will of the people.
126. State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 262 N.W.2d 80, 85 (1978); Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co. v. Washburn Brewing Ass'n, 122 Wis. 515, 518, 100 N.W. 832, 833
(1904).
127. State ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, 97 Wis.
1, 8, 72 N.W. 193, 194 (1897), cited in State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 262 N.W.2d
80, 85-86 (1978).
128. See State v. Dickson, 53 Wis. 2d 532, 539 n.1, 193 N.W.2d 17, 21 n.1 (1971)
(court expressly states that its reference to a contempt statute does not constitute a
"retreat"from its inherent authority position). See also Brautigam, supra note 2, at
1526; Comment, supra note 8, at 1118-19; Statute Law, Contempt-Control by the
Courts and by the Legislature in WYisconsin, 9 WIs. L. Rav. 278 (1934).
129. See State ex rel Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 332, 187 N.W. 830, 845
(1922) (Eschweiler, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 8, at 1118-19.
130. See infra Part V.
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treated civil and criminal contempt separately.13 ' The 1849
statutes set forth definitions, procedures and sanctions for
civil contempt in a chapter entitled: "Of Proceedings as for
Contempts, to Enforce Civil Remedies, and to Protect the
Rights of Parties in Civil Actions."'' 32 The criminal con-
tempt provisions, however, were set forth in a chapter enti-
tled: "General Provisions Concerning Courts of Record, of
the Powers and Duties of Judges, and of Attorneys and Of-
ficers of the Court."'' 33 By 1975 the titles had changed
slightly, but still reflected inexplicable disparities: civil con-
tempt provisions received exclusive treatment in a chapter
entitled "Contempts in Civil Actions";134 criminal contempt
provisions remained in a chapter entitled "General Provi-
sions Concerning Courts of Record, Judges, Attorneys and
Clerks," 135 where they were jumbled in with statutes regard-
ing, among other things, legal holidays, 136 trust accounts, 137
bar examinations, 38 court calendars, 39 taxes 40 and
transcripts. 141
The rationale for those statutory classification systems is
unclear. Separating the provisions for civil and criminal
contempt is understandable, considering the importance of
distinguishing them in order to ensure that due process safe-
guards are provided in criminal contempt proceedings. 142 It
seems illogical, however, to treat civil contempt in relatively
appropriate chapters while treating criminal contempt in
catch-all chapters.
The 1849 civil contempt statute allowed courts to impose
sanctions for "any neglect or violation of duty, or any mis-
conduct, by which the rights or remedies of a party in a
131. Wis. STAT. §§ 256.03-.07, 295.01-.04 (1975); Wis. STAT. ch. 87, §§ 7-9, ch.
115, §§ 1-3, 20-25 (1849).
132. Wis. STAT. ch. 115, §§ 1-3, 20-25 (1849).
133. Id ch. 87, §§ 7-9.
134. Wis. STAT. §§ 295.01-.04 (1975).
135. Id §§ 256.03-.07.
136. Id § 256.17.
137. Id § 256.293.
138. Id § 256.282.
139. Id § 256.39.
140. Id § 256.47.
141. Id § 256.57.
142. See supra Part III, B.
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cause or matter depending in such court, or triable therein,
may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced."' 143 The
statute continued with a laundry list of persons and kinds of
conduct subject to the sanctions, including attorneys, clerks,
sheriffs and coroners who wilfully neglected or violated a
duty, misbehaved, or disobeyed any process or lawful or-
der;144 parties and attorneys who failed to pay any sum of
money ordered to be paid; 45 witnesses who failed to appear,
refused to testify or refused to answer questions; 46 jurors
who improperly talked with a party or with anyone else re-
garding the merits of the case; 147 and anyone who acted as
an attorney or court officer without authority, unlawfully de-
tained a witness or party or otherwise interfered with the
proceedings. 48 With the exception of minor word changes
and renumbering, this statute was not changed until the 1975
revision of the contempt statutes. 49
The 1975 revision eliminated attempts to catalog who
and what was contemptuous. The laundry list was con-
densed into one paragraph:
Every court of record may find in contempt any person
who disobeys any process or lawful order of the court, vio-
lates or neglects an official duty, or is otherwise guilty of
misconduct, by which act the rights or remedies of a party
in an action or proceeding pending or triable in such court
or before a court commissioner for the same county may be
impaired, impeded, defeated or prejudiced.' 50
Sanctions'51 for civil contempt under.the 1849 statutes in-
cluded indemnity for actual losses or injuries, coercive im-
prisonment up to six months and a fine up to $250.152 Again,
143. Wis. STAT. ch. 115, § 1 (1849).
144. Id § i(1).
145. Id § 1(3).
146. Id § 1(5).
147. Id § 1(6).
148. Id § 1(4).
149. 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 401.
150. Wis. STAT. § 295.01 (1975).
151. The 1849 statutes refer to "punishment" when someone is "guilty" of civil
contempt. Wis. STAT. ch. 115, § 20 (1849). See supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
152. Wis. STAT. ch. 115, §§ 20-25 (1849). The statute appears to have allowed
punitive fines, in that, contrary to the imprisonment provisions, no mention is made
of the sanction continuing only until the contemnor complies.
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the provisions were virtually unchanged until the 1975 revi-
sion. The only changes then made were to substitute terms
such as "sanctions" and "found in contempt" for references
to "punishment" and "guilt," and to increase the forfeiture
to a maximum of $2,000 per day of violation.15 3
The 1849 statutory provisions for criminal contempt
were much briefer than the civil contempt provisions, but
again included a laundry list of contemptuous conduct.154 A
person could be found guilty of criminal contempt only by
committing one of the acts listed, including disorderly, con-
temptuous or insolent conduct in the immediate presence of
the court, 55 a breach of the peace, noise or disturbance, 156
disobedience of or resistence to lawful orders or process, 57
refusal to be sworn or tb answer as a witness'58 and publica-
tion of false or inaccurate reports of the proceedings. 59
The 1975 revision retained the laundry list approach, but
condensed the list and added a category:
Every court of record shall have the power to punish, as for
a criminal contempt, persons guilty of either of the follow-
ing acts and no other:
(1) Any breach of the peace, noise, disturbance or
other disorderly or insolent behavior committed in its im-
mediate view and presence, in court or chambers, which
directly tends to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the
respect due its authority.
(2) Wilful and intentional disobedience or obstruction
of, or resistence to any process or order lawfully issued or
made by it.
(3) Wilful refusal to be sworn as a witness or, when so
sworn, the wilful refusal to answer any legal or proper
question when the refusal is not legally justified.
(4) Wilful, intentional and contumacious misconduct
on the basis of which the court could make a finding of
153. Wis. STAT. § 295.02 (1975).
154. Wis. STAT. ch. 87, §§ 7-9 (1849).
155. Id § 7(1).
156. Id § 7(2).
157. Id §§ 7(3), (4).
158. Id § 7(5).
159. Id § 7(6).
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civil contempt under s. 295.01, which challenges and im-
pugns the authority of the court.160
Sanction provisions for criminal contempt under the
1849 statutes included a fine up to $250, imprisonment up to
thirty days or both.' 6' There was but a brief mention of sum-
mary procedure. 62 The 1975 revision provided detailed out-
lines of summary and nonsummary procedures163 and
included different sanctions for the different procedures.' 64
The legislature also added a provision "to enforce any con-
tinuing order of the court for future acts, a fine of not more
than $1,000 for each day of violation, subject to purge by the
defendant's timely compliance with the future acts required
under such continuing order."'' 65 Including sanctions tradi-
tionally indicative of civil contempt proceedings 66 certainly
appeared to accomplish nothing but a further muddying of
the waters.
At the time of the 1975 statutory revision, a judicial mod-
ification of traditional civil sanctions had been in effect for
over half a century. In State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 67 a civil
contempt case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the
imposition of a four month jail sentence with no opportunity
to purge, thereby authorizing purely punitive sanctions in
civil contempt cases. 68 In 1978, however, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court overruled Rodd, sub silentio, on the ground
that "[p]unitive sanctions in civil contempt are contrary to
the well recognized opposite natures of civil and criminal
contempt."'169
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the legisla-
ture had made few substantive changes in the statutory law
of contempt since the law's appearance in the first Wisconsin
160. Wis. STAT. § 256.03 (1975).
161. Wis. STAT. ch. 87, § 8 (1849).
162. Id § 9.
163. Wis. STAT. § 256.04 (1975).
164. Id § 256.06 (maximum of $500 fine or 30 days imprisonment or both for the
summary procedure; maximum of $5,000 fine or one year imprisonment or both for
the nonsummary procedure).
165. Id § 256.06(2) (emphasis added).
166. See supra Part III, A.
167. 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830 (1922).
168. The court called it "a remedial measure. . . for the purpose of preventing
further injury" to the other party. Id at 314, 187 N.W. at 838.
169. State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 137, 262 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1978).
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statutes in 1849. Wisconsin courts have not clamored for
legislative changes, choosing instead to use their inherent
authority to judicially modify substantive contempt law as
deemed necessary.
B. Problems
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not raised challenges
to the traditional contempt laws, but commentators have
raised several distinct grounds for challenge as will be dis-
cussed below. 170
1. Vagueness/Overbreadth
A statute which is either imprecise or too specific can
have a chilling effect upon the exercise of constitutional
rights.' 17  Contempt statutes prohibiting "disorderly or inso-
lent behavior," without further defining the terms, are not
"sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohib-
ited conduct to those who wish to avoid [their] penalties.' 7 2
For example, an attorney is required to "represent a client
zealously,"' 7 3 but at what point does vigorous advocacy cross
over into contemptuous conduct? 174 A defendant is entitled
to cross-examine witnesses,175 but when does cross-examina-
tion become badgering so as to interfere with the orderly
process of the court? Ultimately, resolution of such ques-
tions lies solely within the discretion of the trial judge. 7 6 An
insulting demeanor or tone of voice can result in otherwise
innocuous words being contumacious. Because the de-
meanor or tone of voice will not appear in the record on
170. See also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 185-279 (thorough analysis of con-
stitutional challenges to the contempt power, focusing on challenges based upon the
first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and tenth amendments).
171. See Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1530-32; Comment, supra note 8, at 1124.
172. State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 507, 164 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1969) (citing
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. IMI. 1968), rev'd on other grounds sub
nonz. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)).
173. WISCONSIN CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
174. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 191; Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1532.
For an excellent discussion of courtroom conduct of defense attorneys in relation to
contemptuous behavior, see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 131-68.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
176. Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1531.
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appeal, appellate courts will defer to the trial judge17 7 unless
"[tihe record evinces caprice constituting an abuse of
discretion."178
2. Equal Protection
In many cases one act can constitute both civil and crimi-
nal contempt. 79 If a criminal statute is also violated, the
person could be punished for the criminal violation and the
criminal contempt and also receive a sanction for the civil
contempt. For example, suppose in a default action the de-
fendant-debtor is ordered to give the collateral to the plain-
tiff-creditor. If the defendant instead sets fire to the
collateral so that it is destroyed, the defendant could be sub-
ject to sanctions for civil contempt for disobeying a lawful
order of the court and thereby defeating the rights of the
other party, criminal contempt for wilful and intentional dis-
obedience of a court's lawful order and criminal prosecution
for the crime of arson. Although criminal and civil causes of
action often arise from one incident without giving rise to
equal protection challenges, 80 "[u]tilizing government
power to impose different labels and types of sanctions upon
essentially equivalent actions would seem inherently
suspect.''
3. Judicial Bias
Assume that during the course of a trial a party throws a
statute book at and strikes the judge. The judge has become
the victim of the crime of battery. The judge decides the
person's conduct was sufficiently egregious to support a find-
mng of criminal contempt and, consequently, finds the person
in contempt and imposes a jail sentence. The judge has ac-
ted as judge and jury for a case in which he or she was the
victim. "To allow the offended judge, in a criminal citation,
to act as 'victim, prosecutor, judge and jury' is fundamen-
tally unfair. It is not enough that summary judgment be re-
177. Id
178. State v. Dickson, 53 Wis. 2d 532, 548, 193 N.W.2d 17, 26 (1972).
179. State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 129, 262 N.W.2d 80, 82 (1978).
180. Comment, supra note 8, at 1125 & n.48 (civil wrongful death action and
criminal prosecution for manslaughter allowed against one person for one incident).
181. Id at 1125.
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garded with disfavor; its inherent repugnancy to the
Constitution requires the elimination of the procedure."' 182
One means of minimizing such judicial bias would be to
have the trial judge merely cite the person for contempt,
then turn the entire matter over to a different court. A neu-
tral judge, and jury if appropriate, would try the matter and
impose sentence if the person were found in contempt.1 83
Another method would be to require jury trials whenever
the judge is personally involved, with the jury acting as "in-
sulation between the accused and the judge."'' 84
4. No Alternatives Encouraged
The only sanctions permitted for civil or criminal con-
tempt under the 1975 statutes were fines, imprisonment and
indemnification. 185 There was no statutory provision for any
other means of dealing with contemptuous conduct when the
usual sanctions were ineffective.
In Illinois v. Allen, 86 the United States Supreme Court
approved alternative sanctions to keep order during a crimi-
nal trial. Someone who is behaving in a disruptive manner
must first be warned of the possible sanctions for repeated
disruptions. If the disruptions continue, the person can be
excluded from the trial.187 A second alternative is to use co-
ercive imprisonment under the usual civil contempt proce-
dures. After being held in civil contempt, the disruptive
party can be jailed and the trial discontinued until the con-
temnor agrees to refrain from further disruptions. 88 A simi-
182. Comment, supra note 59, at 294-95 (citations omitted).
183. Id at 305.
184. Id at 294. See also Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1535 n.155 (brief discussion
of the pros and cons of requiring a full trial for contempt proceedings).
185. See supra note 162.
186. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
187. Id at 343. See also N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 72-75
(exclusion sanction frequently employed at murder trial of Charles Manson and three
codefendants).
In criminal proceedings where the defendant is the disruptive person efforts
should be made to provide the defendant with a means of listening to the trial if he or
she is excluded, in order to preserve the sixth amendment right to be present. Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); N. DORSEN & L. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 4, at 98-100.
188. Allen, 397 U.S. at 345. For an analysis of the pros and cons of this tech-
nique, see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 103-05. See also id at 66-69
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lar result is reached by revoking bail and discontinuing the
trial until the contemnor is willing to cooperate. 89 The third
alternative proposed by the Allen Court is to use physical
restraints, but only as a last resort. 90 The exclusion sanction
is preferred because it is less prejudicial and more effective.
One writer argues that the contempt power is superfluous
in civil actions, and suggests that marshalls or deputies be
used to bring in recalcitrant witnesses, levy execution on
property, or otherwise enforce the authority of the courts
and protect the rights of parties.19'
Only when all methods of ordinary civil execution have
failed, and an individual's recalcitrance has gone to the
point of positive interference with government, should the
broad and powerful contempt sanction be applied. Then it
would be a criminal interference with government, and
more than a personal dispute between litigants. Of course,
the dividing line is hard to draw.' 92
V. THE 1979 STATUTES: ERASING THE DISTINCTIONS 193
Wisconsin legislators quickly realized that the 1975 revi-
sion of criminal and civil contempt statutes did not accom-
plish its intended purpose: "to eliminate some of the
confusion."' 194 Because much of the confusion resulted from
attempts to distinguish civil from criminal contempt on the
basis of the penalty imposed, 95 the new statute draws the
distinction on the basis of the purpose of the sanction sought
(imprisonment and adjournment of trial sanction used in trial of members of Black
Panther Party).
189. Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967).
190. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344; N. DoRsEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 100-02.
See also id at 57-59 (gagging and binding of Bobby Seale during Chicago Seven
conspiracy trial).
191. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 48, at 293.
192. Id
193. Robert J. Martineau was the reporter for the Wisconsin Judicial Council
Committee on Contempt, 1979-1980. His article on the changes in Wisconsin
contempt law, supra note 16, contains many personal insights into the intent and
concerns of the Committee while drafting the new law. To avoid duplication, the
statutory changes will be discussed in general terms in this comment, with references
to the more detailed analysis found in the Martineau article.
194. Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 785 committee comment (West 1981). See Martineau,
supra note 16, at 687.
195. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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to be imposed. 196 "Under this approach, the statute does not
attempt to draw a distinction between civil and criminal con-
tempt,"'197 although the concepts of civil and criminal con-
tempt are retained in the provisions for remedial and
punitive sanctions. 98
After the detailed, exhaustive "laundry lists" of earlier
statutes, 9 9 section 785.01 of the new statute is refreshing in
its brevity and clarity.2° By using broader terms and fewer
details, the legislature intended to made the statute more in-
clusive;20' however, that broad general language may result
in greater susceptibility to challenges on grounds of over-
breadth and vagueness.2 0 2 "Disobedience of a court order,"
for example, could still encompass protected behavior. An
important change is the intent requirement. Thus, "for any
act to be contempt it must be intentional rather than inad-
vertent or accidental. '20 3
196. Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 785 committee comment (West 1981).
197. Id "Civil contempt" and "criminal contempt" are never mentioned in the
chapter. See Martineau, supra note 16, at 688-89 n.78 (detailed list of civil and crimi-
nal contempt statutes in other states).
198. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.01 committee comment (West 1981). The courts' in-
herent authority to impose sanctions for contempt is retained in Wis. STAT. § 785.02
(1979): "A court of record may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt
of court under this chapter."
199. See supra Part IV,A.
200. Wis. STAT. § 785.01 (1979), in its entirety, is as follows:
Definitions.
(1) "Contempt of court" means intentional:
(a) Misconduct in the presence of the court which interferes with a court
proceeding or with the administration ofjustice, or which impairs the respect
due the court;
(b) Disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or
order of a court;
(c) Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or answer a question; or
(d) Refusal to produce a record, document or other object.
(2) "Punitive sanction" means a sanction imposed to punish a past contempt
of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court.
(3) "Remedial sanction" means a sanction imposed for the purpose of termi-
nating a continuing contempt of court.
Martineau classifies the four types of conduct as follows: "(1) conduct in the
courtroom; (2) compliance with court orders; (3) conduct of a witness; and (4) produc-
tion of documents or other things." Martineau, supra note 16, at 689.
201. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.01 committee comment (West 1981).
202. See supra Part IV, B, 1.
203. Martineau, supra note 16, at 689-90.
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The new section dealing with contempt procedures con-
denses and clarifies the procedures under earlier statutes, 204
but also includes some new provisions. The most important
addition is the requirement that courts decide at the outset
what sanction is sought, and then determine the procedure to
be used. Nonsummary procedure can be used whether a re-
medial sanction or a punitive sanction is sought, whereas
summary procedure is expressly limited to punitive
sanctions.
The nonsummary procedure for a remedial sanction
must be initiated by filing a motion. The motion procedure
is governed by the same rules of procedure, whether civil or
criminal, as those governing the underlying matter. "A per-
son must be aggrieved by the contempt to have standing to
file the motion. This incorporates the concept . . . that a
contempt must in some way impair or prejudice the rights or
remedies of the person in the original proceeding." 205 The
204. Wis. STAT. § 785.03 (1979) is as follows:
Procedure.
(1) NONSUMMARY PROCEDURE. (a) Remedial sanction. A person ag-
grieved by a contempt of court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction for
the contempt by filing a motion for that purpose in the proceeding to which the
contempt is related. The court, after notice and hearing, may impose a reme-
dial sanction authorized by this chapter.
(b) Punitive sanction. The district attorney'of a county, the attorney gen-
eral or a special prosecutor appointed by the court may seek the imposition of
a punitive sanction by issuing a complaint charging the person with contempt
of court and reciting the sanction sought to be imposed. The district attorney,
attorney general or special prosecutor may issue the complaint on his or her
own initiative or on the request of a party to an action or proceeding in a court
or of the judge presiding in an action or proceeding. The complaint shall be
processed under chs. 967 to 973. If the contempt alleged involves disrespect to
or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial of
the contempt unless the person charged consents to the judge presiding at the
trial.
(c) Joint hearing and trial. The court may hold a hearing on a motion for
a remedial sanction jointly with a trial on a complaint seeking a punitive sanc-
tion.
(2) SUMMARY PROCEDURE. The judge presiding in an action or proceed-
ing may impose a punitive sanction upon a person who commits a contempt of
court in the actual presence of the court. The judge shall impose the punitive
sanction immediately after the contempt of court and only for the purpose of
preserving order in the court and protecting the authority and dignity of the
court.
205. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.03 committee comment (West 1981). See Martineau,
supra note 16, at 695-701.
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notice and hearing provision satisfies basic due process
requirements.
The nonsummary procedure in which a punitive sanction
is sought is identical to criminal procedure for a statutory
crime. A person complaining of contempt, whether a private
individual or a judge, must present the facts to the appropri-
ate prosecutorial officer. Due process protections embodied
in the criminal procedure chapters of the statutes206 apply to
punitive sanction proceedings for contempt. Because there
is no distinction between the two kinds of proceedings, the
legislature included no provision for criminal prosecution
for the same conduct punished with a punitive sanction.
"Even if not prevented by the technical requirements of
double jeopardy, there should be only one punishment for
any criminal type act."207
An important addition is the provision disqualifying a
judge from presiding at a trial if the alleged contempt was
directed at the judge personally. This goes to the heart of
the concerns relating to judicial bias.2 0 8 Though a possibility
still exists that a judge may be biased even when not person-
ally attacked, the potential for such a conflict is greatly re-
duced by this provision.
The joint hearing provision promotes administrative effi-
ciency by avoiding duplication of court proceedings, but will
probably be used rarely due to the increased potential for
confusion. The legislature felt the option should be avail-
able even though the two proceedings may involve different
personnel, evidence and standards of proof.20 9
The summary procedure is extremely limited, both as to
exercise of the power and as to severity of the penalty al-
lowed. The term "actual presence of the court" was substi-
tuted for the former term, "immediate view and presence of
the court," to bring Wisconsin law into accord with federal
law, such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(A).210
Although a hearing regarding the nature or circumstances of
206. Wis. STAT. cs. 967-73 (1979).
207. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.03 committee comment (West 1981). See supra Part
IV, B, 2.
208. See supra Part IV, B, 3. See also Martineau, supra note 16, at 697.
209. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.03 committee comment (West 1981).
210. Martineau, supra note 16, at 700.
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the contempt is not necessary, the record must reveal the
conduct identified as contemptuous.2 1' The punitive sanc-
tions allowed in summary proceedings are less than one-
tenth the severity of the punitive sanctions allowed in non-
summary proceedings. 212
Few changes were made in the sanction provisions21 3
other than reorganizing them to fit within the new format.
One important change, however, is the provision allowing
alternative remedial sanctions, provided the court first ex-
pressly finds that the other sanctions listed in the statute
would be ineffectual. This provision apparently will allow
use of alternative sanctions such as exclusion, imprisonment
211. Id
212. Wis. STAT. § 785.04(2)(a), (b) (1979) (maximum of $500 or 30 days or both
for summary procedure; maximum of $5,000 or one year or both for nonsummary
procedure).
213. Wis. STAT. § 785.04 (1979) is as follows:
Sanctions authorized.
(1) REMEDIAL SANCTION. A court may impose one or more of the follow-
ing remedial sanctions:
(a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party for a loss
or injury suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court.
(b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is of a type included in s.
785.01(l)(b), (c) or (d). The imprisonment may extend only so long as the
person is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, whichever is the
shorter period.
(c) A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each day the contempt of court
continues.
(d) An order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the
court.
(e) A sanction other than the sanctions specified in pars. (a) to (d) if it
expressly finds that those sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a contin-
uing contempt of court.
(2) PUNITIVE SANCTION. (a) Nonsummary procedure. A court, after a
finding of contempt of court in a nonsummary procedure under s. 785.03(l)(b),
may impose for each separate contempt of court a fine of not more than $5,000
or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or both.
(b) Summaryprocedure. A court, after a finding of contempt of court in a
summary procedure under s. 785.03(2), may impose for each separate con-
tempt of court a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than 30 days or both.
(3) PAST CONDUCT. A punitive sanction may be imposed for past con-
duct which was a contempt of court even though similar present conduct is a
continuing contempt of court.
See Martineau, supra note 16, at 701-04 (detailed discussion of the changes).
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coupled with suspension of the trial, and physical
restraints.1 4
VI. STANDARDS, SUCCESSES AND SUGGESTIONS
Many commentators have suggested ways to modify the
statutory law of contempt.1 5 The numerous specific con-
cerns raised can be addressed in three broad categories, then
applied to the 1979 contempt statutes.
First, the courts' inherent powers must be preserved.21 6
The courts must be allowed sufficient means to maintain or-
derly administration of justice, to protect the rights of parties
and to compel compliance with their orders. The new stat-
utes meet this requirement.21 7
Second, the provisions for procedures and sanctions must
be clear and unambiguous in order to avoid abuse and con-
fusion. But there should be some flexibility in sanctions to
allow fashioning the remedy or punishment to suit the cir-
cumstances of the case. 21 8  The sanction provisions in the
1979 statutes are unquestionably clear and unambiguous,
and some flexibility is allowed in fashioning remedial sanc-
tions. The procedural requirements have been greatly clari-
fied, but certain aspects which are not mentioned, such as
appeal rights219 and the burden of proof in the nonsummary
remedial procedure, remain unclear.
Third, contemnors' constitutional rights must be pro-
tected.220 The new statutes meet this requirement by having
constitutional safeguards built into the procedural provi-
sions. Due process protections are provided for the nonsum-
mary remedial sanction procedure, and the nonsummary
214. See supra Part IV, B, 4.
215. E.g., Brautigam, supra note 2, at 1534-36; Comment, supra note 8, at 1127-
34.
216. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
217. Wis. STAT. §§ 785.01-.02 (1979).
218. For example, an indigent may be unperturbed if a large fine were imposed,
and may be equally unconcerned about a jail term if he or she is already serving time
in prison. Some other form of sanction may have greater impact.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 100-106. The incorporation of the crimi-
nal procedure chapters stopped just short of the chapter providing for appeals from
criminal convictions, leaving a question as to whether immediate appeal is available.
The remedial sanction procedural provisions do not facially require that the appeal be
delayed until resolution of the underlying cause of action.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
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punitive sanction procedure incorporates many of the consti-
tutional safeguards, as established in the Wisconsin statutes
on criminal procedure. A potential for challenge on grounds
of vagueness or overbreadth remains, particularly in regard
to what conduct impairs the respect due the court.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Legislature tackled contempt of court, an
area of statutory and case law which has been confused and
confusing since 1849. The legislature managed to retain in
the new contempt statutes many of the characteristics distin-
guishing civil from criminal contempt, but avoided the
"blurred edges" problem. The new statutes do more than
clarify the civil-criminal contempt distinction: they elimi-
nate it. Although some further improvements are needed,
the new statutes clarify and facilitate contempt proceedings
beyond what most courts and commentators anticipated.
MARNA M. TESS-MATTNER
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